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Friedman: Trusts and Estates

Trusts and Estates
by K. Bruce Friedman*
In the field of trusts and estates, the year 1967 was fairly
eventful. Examination of the court decisions reveals a continuing trend toward construing documents wherever possible
to conform with the presumed intent of the testator or trustor,
and toward liberal construction of statutory language. At
the same time, several decisions hold in favor of creditors in
their relationships with the decedent's estate or his survivors.
From a legislative standpoint, there were several noteworthy
revisions in the Probate and Civil Codes, most important of
which was the adoption of a modified version of the Revised
Uniform Principal and Income Act.
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Case Law
In the area of interpreting personal intent, Lawson v.
Lowengad deals with the important question of the validity
of an inter vivos trust. The court in construing the trustor's
apparent intent, and thereby negating the trust, strongly reaffirmed existing principles of law. The decedent in this case,
shortly before suffering a heart attack that subsequently resulted in her death, had, on two occasions, discussed with an
attorney the preparation of an inter vivos trust that would
include most of her property. The second discussion took
place on the day preceding the heart attack. Several days
later the attorney presented a trust instrument to the decedent,
which the decedent signed without reading. The attorney
thereupon left the hospital with the trust agreement and obtained the signatures of the named trustees. The trust agreement purported to transfer securities held in an agency account with a bank, and also authorized the trustees to receive
other property. The trust was to be revocable by the decedent
during her lifetime. As of the date of the decedent's death, a
few days after she signed the trust agreement, the securities
remained in the agency account in the bank's possession, not
yet having been transferred to the trustees. The court of appeal, in affirming the trial court's judgment in a quiet-title
action brought by the executors of an earlier will, held that
mere execution of the trust agreement is not sufficient to establish an inter vivos trust where there has been no actual or
constructive delivery of corpus to the trustees.
The court held, first, that, on the key point of intent, there
was substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding
that the decedent signed the trust instrument under a mistake
of fact since she had not read the document and did not understand it, and because certain provisions of the trust were contrary to her repeatedly expressed wishes. Further, the court
held that actual or symbolic delivery to the trustees of the trust
corpus was essential to the validity of the trust, and was absent
here. The agency account securities had not been indorsed
1. 251 Cal. App.2d 98, 59 Cal. Rptr.
186 (1967).
206
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or physically delivered prior to the decedent's death; and in
the absence of evidence of directions from the decedent for
delivery of the trust instrument to the trustees, the fact that
the decedent signed the instrument and handed it to her attorney did not itself constitute constructive delivery.
In reaching its decision on these points, the court relied on
numerous prior rulings indicating that mistake of fact,2 lack
of intent to effect a delivery,3 and lack of effective delivery4
were sufficient to negate the effect of signing the trust instrument.
In a second case, Estate of Taylor,5 the supreme court
stretched the meaning of Probate Code section 142 in order to
effectuate the desires of a testator. In this case, the decedent
by her will left one-third of the residue of her estate to a friend,
on the condition that the friend survive distribution of the
estate. Otherwise, this third was to go to two alternate beneficiaries, one of whom was also the executor of the decedent's
will. The legatee died eighteen months after the decedent,
but prior to distribution. The court held, on the basis of a
reasonable timetable for administering this estate, that the
executor had delayed unreasonably in making distribution,
that the estate should have been distributed before the legatee
died, and that the interest of the legatee consequently vested in
her before her death.
The probate court had found that the estate could have been
distributed in September, 1964, and should have been distributed before the legatee's death in March, 1965. The
executor instead decided, in the fall of 1964, to sell securities,
many of which could have been distributed in kind without
detriment to the cash needs of the estate. The supreme court
held that the findings were supported by the evidence, and on
these facts found that the legatee's contingent interest had
2. Turino v. Capra, 237 Cal. App.2d
733, 47 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1965).
3. See Bank of America v. Frost, 205
Cal. App.2d 614, 23 Cal. Rptr. 441
(1962); Kunde v. Kunde, 122 Cal App.
2d 624, 266 P.2d 608 (1954); Estate of
McConkey, 33 Cal. App.2d 554, 92 P.

2d 456 (1939); Jeannerette v. Taylor, ::
Cal. App.2d 568, 38 P.2d 831 (1934).
4. Miller v. Jansen, 21 Cal.2d 473.
132 P.2d 801 (1943).
5. 66 Cal.2d 855, 59 Cal. Rptr. 437,
428 P.2d 301 (1967).
CAL LAW 1967

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

207

3

I rusts and Estates

Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 10

vested at the time distribution should have been made. The
legatee's estate was thus entitled to her interest in the decedent's estate.
In its decision, the court took note of Probate Code section
142,6 but found no inconsistency between the statute and its
own determination that the legatee's contingent interest had
vested. The opinion of the court stressed that:
The crucial issue under this section is whether a clause
requiring survivorship should be interpreted to mean
survivorship to distribution or survivorship to the time
distribution should have occurred, or, as an alternative,
whether survivorship to the earlier date constitutes substantial compliance with the condition. Under either
interpretation we believe that unreasonable delay cannot
defeat the beneficiary's interest. This conclusion promotes the established policy favoring prompt distribution
of estates . . . and carries out the presumed intent of
7
the testatrix.
Another issue worthy of comment resulted from the cross
appeal of the personal representative of the primary beneficiary's estate, on the ground that the trial court had allowed
the executor and his attorney extraordinary compensation.
The court ruled that the allowance of the extra compensation
was justified in spite of the delay in settling the estate because
of otherwise justified services. It would seem more in keeping
with the policy favoring the swift settlement of estates for a
court first to consider and fix the extraordinary compensation
and then to deduct a certain sum to compensate for unnecessary delay in distribution.
In a federal estate tax case dealing with the important question whether property held in a revocable trust can at the same
time be community property, the United States Court of Ap6. "A condition precedent in a will is
one which is required to be fulfilled before a particular disposition takes effect.
It is to be deemed performed when the
testator's intention has been substantially, though not literally, complied with.
208
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peals for the Ninth Circuit, reversing the trial court, relied
heavily on the intent of the trustors. In Katz v. United States,S
property, which for purposes of the decision was assumed to
be post-1927 California community property, was transferred
to a revocable trust naming the husband as trustor. The provisions of the trust instrument reserved to the husband-trustor,
during his lifetime, full rights to the trust income and the right
to amend or revoke the trust. After the husband's death, the
trust was to continue for the benefit of the wife during her lifetime, and then for the benefit of the children. Both husband
and wife had affixed written approval to the trust instrument.
Later, the husband caused the trust to be amended twice, and
in each instance the wife's written approval was obtained.
The United States District Court for the Southern District
of California9 had held that by reason of the powers reserved
to the husband, the execution of the trust transmuted community property into the husband's separate property. Since
the provisions of the continuing trust did not meet the requirements of the federal estate tax marital deduction, the entire
trust property was held includible in the husband's taxable
estate. The Ninth Circuit reversed,lO holding that the statutory presumption that property acquired by the spouses during
marriage is community propertyll is particularly strong when
the property was acquired with community property, and that
this presumption extends to every type of property, including
a retained equitable interest in a trust. 12
On the particular facts, the court found no language by
which the wife had conveyed any property interest to the husband. The wife's consent to each amendment of the trust (in
the absence of which the wife, after the husband's death, could
have set aside the trust as to her community property interest)
was taken to be an indication of the parties' belief that she had
8. 382 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. [1967]).
9. 255 F. Supp. 642 (1966).
10. In reversing, the court remanded
for determination of the community
character of the properties at the time
of conveyance to the trust.
11. Cal. Civ. Code § 164.
14
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191 Cal. App.2d 171, 12 Cal. Rptr. 522
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v. Johnson, 73 Cal. App.2d 139, 166 P.
2d 67 (1946).
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a community property interest. The court thus concluded that
there had been no intent by her to transmute community property to separate property of the husband. It further held that
the trust did not confer upon the husband a general power of
appointment over the wife's interest in the community property
held in the trust, but rather that whatever powers the husband
had with respect to the trust property were held by him as
manager of or agent for the community.
The Ninth Circuit's decision would seem to be correct. The
facts suggest no intent to transmute community into separate
property, and the interposition of a trustee holding legal title
should not change the result. The import of the decision, in
addition to the estate tax result, must also be that no taxable
gift from the wife to the husband had taken place. Finally,
and very important, in holding that under California law, a
retained equitable interest in a trust can be community property, the court provides needed support for the position that
appreciated community property placed in a revocable trust
qualifies, on the death of the first of the spouses to die, for a
full stepped-up basis for federal income tax purposes. 13
In keeping with the preceding cases, which evidence liberality in construing intent of testators or trustors, the courts in
the cases noted below show liberality in statutory construction.
Although it represents a somewhat special situation, an indication of the courts' approach to statutory construction was
evident in Estate of Chichernea. 14 This case held that California residents can validly bequeath property to persons who
are citizens and residents of Rumania. The issue arose because Probate Code section 259 makes the inheritance rights
of aliens not residing in the United States dependent upon the
existence of reciprocal, nondiscriminatory rights of inheritance
on the part of United States citizens under the laws of the
foreign beneficiary's country. The court determined that
temporary restrictions imposed by Rumanian law upon the
right of United States citizens to remove inheritance proceeds
13. lnt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(b)
(6). See also Rev. Rul. 66-283, 19662 Cum. Bull. 297.
210
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from Rumania were not fatal to the reciprocity required by
Probate Code section 259, since a restriction upon removal is
comparable to a currency restriction, and is not a limitation
on the right to inherit. The court referred to its decision some
months earlier, wherein it used similar reasoning to uphold
the right of citizens and residents of the Soviet Union to inherit from California residents. 15 It reaffirmed the principle
that reciprocity does not turn on whether the political and
socioeconomic institutions of the foreign nation are in accord
with our own. Unless the ability of a United States resident
to inherit under the law of the foreign country is "economically
insignificant," all that section 259 requires is that the right of a
United States citizen to inherit in the foreign country be on a
parity with the right of one of that country's citizens to receive an inheritance in his own country. In applying this
standard the court emphasized that not only the written law
itself but also the manner in which it had been consistently
applied should be considered. Answering the State of California's argument that on the date of death, Rumanian law
required alien beneficiaries to secure official approval to dispose of the proceeds of a Rumanian estate and that there was
consequently no reciprocity, the court further pointed out that
the time of distribution would be the proper moment to determine the freedom of our citizens to remove inheritance proceeds.
Of somewhat wider application in the matter of statutory interpretation was the court's decision in Estate of Christiansen. 16 This case holds that, in addition to distributions of surplus income that are already specifically permitted by statute,17
a probate court has the power to authorize the making of gifts
of principal from an incompetent's estate for estate-planning
purposes. The incompetent in this case was in her seventies,
and there was virtually no possibility of her restoration to
competency. The income of the incompetent's estate was
more than sufficient to maintain her. On the basis of Probate
Code section 1558/8 the probate court had authorized the
15. Estate of Larkin, 65 Cal.2d 60,
52 Cal. Rptr. 441, 416 P.2d 473 (1966).
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guardian to pay surplus income of the estate to each of the
incompetent's adult children, but had ruled that it possessed
no authority to permit the guardian to make gifts from principal to the incompetent's children and grandchildren. The
court of appeal, however, concluded that the probate court,
in the exercise of its equitable powers, might substitute its
judgment for that of the incompetent and authorize gifts of
principal to the natural objects of the incompetent's bounty,
in situations not covered by section 1558. The court also
relied upon Probate Code section 1516, which provides that:
[I]n all cases where no other or no different procedure
is provided by statute, the court on petition of the
guardian,'
may from time to time instruct the
guardian as to the administration of the ward's estate
and the disposition, management, care, protection or
preservation of the estate or any property thereof. . . .
In establishing this new California rule, permitting gifts to
be made from principal, the court, citing authority from other
jurisdictions, held that "the guardian should be authorized
to act as a reasonable and prudent man would act under
the same circumstances, unless there is evidence of any settled intention of the incompetent, formed while sane, to the
contrary."19 The court reversed the order of the probate
court and remanded the case for further proceedings, indicating that before authorizing gifts of the incompetent's property, the probate court should consider the needs of the
incompetent, the permanency of the disability, the devolution
of the property upon the incompetent's death and the presumed donative intent.
Thus the court, in expanding Probate Code section 1558
by combining it with Probate Code section 1516, has now
18. "On the application of the guardian or next of kin of an insane or incompetent person, the court may direct
the guardian to pay and distribute surplus income, not used for the support
and maintenance of the ward, or any
part of such surplus income, to the next
of kin whom the ward would, in the
212
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amounts and proportions thereof shall
be discretionary with the court . . . ."
19. 248 Cal. App.2d at 422-423, 56
Cal. Rptr. at 521 (1967).
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authorized transfers of the incompetent's property for the
purpose of avoiding unnecessary estate and inheritance taxes
and expenses of administration. This decision is particularly
important to estate planners, who may now obtain court
sanction for gifts from guardianship estates.
Although the preceding cases bend the statutory language,
the court in Satterfield v. Garmire 20 relied on equitable principles to virtually nullify a statute. Contrary to the specific
language of the statute, the court excused, under a special
combination of circumstances, the failure to file or present
a creditor's claim within the period prescribed by Probate
Code sections 700 and 707. The case involved actions for
personal injuries and wrongful death that were commenced
against the decedent's estate some two months after the first
publication of notice to creditors, at a time when negotiations with the decedent's insurance carrier were already in
progress. These negotiations commenced before, and continued until after, expiration of the six-month period prescribed by statute for filing or presenting creditors' claims.
In holding that the trial court had improperly sustained a
general demurrer to the plaintiff's amended complaint without leave to amend, the supreme court found that the purpose
of Probate Code section 707 is twofold. First, it insures
that the personal representative will be notified within a
reasonable period of time of all claims so that the estate
may be expeditiously settled. Second, it provides an opportunity for amicable disposition of a claim prior to the commencement of any action and thus protects the estate from
the expense of needless litigation.
The court stated that since the defendant had already
received all the benefits that section 707 was intended to
confer, the plaintiff should not be denied the right to sue.
In this connection the court noted that negotiations for settlement were carried on for two months prior to the filing of
the action and did not cease until after expiration of the
six-month period, and that the action was filed by mutual
20. 65 Cal.2d 638, 56 Cal. Rptr. 102,
422 P.2d 990 (1967).
CAL LAW 1967
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agreement. Thus the executor was not in breach of his
fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries in impliedly waiving the
code provision. The court emphasized the fact that generally it is not within the authority of an executor or administrator to waive formal presentation of a claim, but concluded
that:

[H]e may do so where this congeries of circumstances
exists prior to the expiration of the period for filing
a claim; he has knowledge of the claim and concedes
its merit save only as to the specific sum; the estate is
protected by insurance coverage exceeding the amount
of the claim; and waiver results in relinquishment of
no substantial benefit of or causes no detriment to the
heirs or legatees. 1
This case is noteworthy, since most lawyers and commentators
have assumed that the statute of limitations on filing creditors'
claims was absolute and without exception.
In the area of protecting creditors' rights, an important
decision is Estate of Silverman. 2 This case of first impression
holds that a widow's family allowance, in the hands of the
executor of her husband's estate, is not exempt from attachment and execution.
The case involved separate attachments, ancillary to a
municipal court action against the widow, levied upon the
executor, who consequently withheld payment of family
allowance that had been ordered paid to the widow. Affirming the trial court's ruling, the court held that a family
allowance is not property specifically exempted from execution under section 690 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
the sections enumerated therein. Therefore, since there is
no specific statutory exemption, a family allowance is subject
to attachment under section 541 of the Code of Civil Procedure,3 as a debt due the defendant and as property of the
1. 65 Cal.2d at 645, 56 Cal. Rptr. at
107, 422 P.2d at 995.
2. 249 Cal. App.2d 180, 57 Cal. Rptr.
379 (1967).
214
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defendant. In dismissing the argument that such funds are
in custodia legis, subject to attachment only with permission
of the court exercising custody, the court held that the funds
are actually in the hands of the executor, who is under a court
order to distribute them.
The important question suggested by this case is whether
a widow's family allowance should in fact be subject to
attachment. Perhaps statutory exemption should be conferred on this type of fund, on a basis comparable to a judgment debtor's exemption under section 690.11 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. 4 An alternative solution would be to
grant an exemption for the family allowance on a basis analogous to the spendthrift trust, where only excess income
can be reached by creditors. 5 In other words, statutory
exemption would be provided for that part of the family
allowance award that is necessary for basic support. 6
In another case, Rupp v. Kahn,7 the court decided an issue
of significance with respect to transfers made for the purpose
of avoiding obligations to creditors. The decision passed on
a question apparently never decided in California in the
context of the rights of a surviving joint tenant. The court
fendant may have in the stock of any
corporation or company, together with
the interest and profit thereon, and all
debts due such defendant, and all other
property in this State of such defendant
not exempt from execution, may be attached, and if judgment be recovered,
be sold to satisfy the judgment and execution."
4. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 690.1l.
"Property exempt from execution or attachment: Earnings: Filing with levying officer affidavit of service of sum·
mons and complaint or of notice that
attachment on earnings to issue. Onehalf of the earnings of the defendant or
judgment debtor received for his personal services rendered at any time within 30 days next preceding the levy of
attachment or execution shall be exempt
from execution or attachment without

filing a claim for exemption as provided
in Section 690.26.
"All of such earnings, if necessary for
the use of the debtor's family, residing
in this State, and supported in whole
or in part by such debtor unless the
debts are: (a) incurred by such debtor,
his wife or family, for the common necessaries of life; or, (b) incurred for personal services rendered by any employee, or former employee, of such
debtor. . . ."
5. Cal. Civ. Code § 859.
6. See Cal. Prob. Code § 680, which
states in part that the family allowance
shall provide what is "necessary for
their maintenance according to their
circumstances." This has been constrned to mean the standard of living
as it existed during the lifetime of the
deceased. In re Lux Estate, 114 Cal.
73, 45 P. 1023 (1896).
CAL LAW 1967
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held that where an insolvent, without consideration, places
property in joint tenancy, the entire title held by the surviving
joint tenant is subject to the debts of the deceased joint tenant.
In his complaint, the creditor alleged that the decedent, while
insolvent, had acquired various properties, taking title in
the names of his wife and himself as joint tenants. The
creditor sought a declaration that the wife as surviving joint
tenant held the property as trustee for the benefit of plaintiff
as a creditor. Reversing the trial court's holding, which had
sustained a demurrer to this cause of action without leave
to amend, the court of appeal held that an insolvent's creation of a joint tenancy, without consideration, is a transfer
in fraud of creditors. 8 The decision stated that after the
insolvent's death, as well as during his lifetime, his creditors
can reach the entire joint tenancy property.9 In the usual
case, by comparison, a joint tenant's undivided interest is
reachable by his creditors only during his lifetime, and, at his
death, complete title vests in the surviving joint tenant and the
entire property is placed beyond the reach of the decedent's
creditors. 1o
Finally, a decision that construes statutory language strictly
is Estate of Johnston. ll In this case, the court held that a
minor child, who attempts to reach his father's income interest in a spendthrift trust in enforcement of support claims,
like any other creditor, can reach only income in excess of
the amount necessary for the beneficiary's support. 12 The
appellant, the children's guardian, had contended that her
children were in a special preferred category, despite Civil
Code section 859/ 3 regardless of whether there was excess
7. 246 Cal. App.2d 188, 55 Cal. Rptr.
108 (1966).
8. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04.
9. With respect to creditors' rights
against the property during the insolvent's lifetime, see Carter v. Carter, 55
Cal. App.2d 13, 130 P.2d 186 (1942).
10. It would seem that the opinion
in this case should be the same, regardless of whether the property conveyed
into joint tenancy would be community
216
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11. 252 Cal. App.2d 988, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 852 (1967).
12. Cal. Civ. Code § 859.
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and profits liable to creditors in certain
cases. Where a trust is created to receive the rents and profits of real or
personal property, and no valid direction for accumulation is given, the sur-
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income and regardless of the spendthrift provisions. Rejecting this argument, the court determined that the statute makes
no special exception that would permit the child to reach
the beneficiary's interest in the trust without a finding as to
excess income.
The court pointed out that although this was a case of
first impression, San Diego Trust and Savings Bank v. Heustis14
had involved a similar problem; a divorced wife was attempting to reach income from a spendthrift trust, advancing the
same proposition but seeking alimony rather than childsupport payments. The court in that case had refused to
treat the woman as a special or preferred creditor.
Legislative Developments
The most signicant legislative development in the field of
trusts was the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act,15
which is operative July 1, 1968.16 Significant provisions of
the Act deal with the establishment of reserves for depreciation; the depletion of natural resources; the treatment of
extraordinary corporate distributions; and the right to income
earned during probate administration. The new Act is applicable to any receipt or expense received or incurred after
its operative date, regardless of when the trust was established. 17
Prior to the 1967 legislation, the California Principal and
Income Law was silent on the question of establishing reserves
for depreciation. IS A recent decision on the point had been
Estate of Kelley.I9 In the Kelley case, the trustees of a testaplus of such rents and profits, beyond
the sum that may be necessary for the
education and support of the person for
whose benefit the trust is created, is liable to the claims of the creditors of such
persons, in the same manner as personal
property which cannot be reached by execution."
14. 121 Cal. App. 675, 10 P.2d 158
(1932).
15. Cal. Stats, 1967, chap. 1508, §§ 1,
2,p.-.
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16. New Cal. Civ. Code § 730.16.
Note that the new act applies to trusts
only and does not include the legal life
estate. Compare old § 730.04 (Cal.
Stats. 1953, ch. 37, § 1, p. 667) with
new § 730.03(b).
17. Cal. Civ. Code § 730.15.
18. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 730-730.15.
(Added Cal. Stats. 1967 ch. 1508, § 2.)
19. 63 Cal.2d 679, 47 Cal. Rptr. 897,
408 P.2d 353 (1965).
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mentary trust had borrowed $200,000 in order to remodel
and structurally improve a building containing a store. These
improvements were made in order to obtain renewal of a
favorable lease of the store premises held in the trust. The
court determined that depreciation should be charged against
income, on the basis of the value of the extraordinary capital
improvements over their anticipated useful life, and that this
treatment produced an equitable result as between the life
tenant and the remainderman. The court further stated that
depreciation of income-producing real property that was part
of the original corpus received by the trustee is also a proper
charge against income, unless the trust instrument expresses
a contrary intent.
The 1967 California legislation departs from the rule
stated in the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act,
which adopted the same rule as that in the Kelley case. The
California version of the Act leaves the establishment of reserves for depreciation to the "absolute discretion" of the
trustee, unless the governing instrument provides otherwise. 20
It further provides that whatever allowance for depreciation
the trustee may make shall be made "under generally accepted
accounting principles,"l but that no allowance shall be made
for depreciation of that portion of real property used by a
beneficiary as a residence. The meaning of "generally accepted accounting principles," a phrase that also appears in
the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, may be
questioned. For example, in Estate of Kellei the court
indicated that depreciation should be taken on a straight-line
basis over the anticipated useful life of the improvements.
However, there are various acceptable methods of calculating depreciation, and the revised rule may well be interpreted
to permit these variations.
Another potential difficulty could arise from the provision
of the new law that when an unincorporated business is held
20. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 730.13(a)(2),
730.14. The legislative negation of the
requirement of Kelley, that depreciation
be taken, is immediate. This result is
achieved by newly-enacted § 730.16 of
the present Principal and Income law,
218
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1. Cal. Civ. Code § 730.13(a)(2).
2. 63 Cal.2d at 689, 47 Cal. Rptr. at
903, 408 P.2d at 359 (1965).
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in trust, the net profits, "computed in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles for a comparable business," are income. 3 To the extent that such accounting principles may require that reserves for depreciation be established
for business properties, this section is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Act that give the trustee absolute discretion
over whether to establish depreciation reserves.
The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act also deals
with depletion of natural resources. Under old Civil Code
section 730.11, proceeds received from depletion of natural
resources were to be wholly allocated to income unless the
trustee was under a duty to reinvest the property from which
the proceeds were derived. New Civil Code sections 730.09730.11 change the rule to provide that, with certain exceptions,4 and with the limitation that any allowance for depletion be reasonable, the trustee is to have absolute discretion
in allocating receipts from natural resources to principal or
income.
Turning to other provisions of the 1967 principal and income legislation, new Civil Code section 730.06, dealing
with extraordinary corporate distributions, is a departure from
old section 730.07, which provided that distributions of corporate shares that were not of the same kind or rank, or were
not derived from a capitalization of surplus, were income.
The new section adopts the so-called "Massachusetts rule,"
which provides that all corporate distributions of shares and
subscription rights of the distributing corporation be treated
as principal. It also provides that capital gains distributions
of a regulated investment company are principa1. 6 This provision is of special importance in protecting the federal estate
tax deduction for a charitable remainder interest under a
trust, from the standpoint of preserving the ascertainable value
of the remainder interest. 6
The new Principal and Income Act changes the law as
to the right to income earned during probate adminstration,
3. New Cal. Civ. Code § 730.08.
4. See Cal. Civ. Code § 730.09 for
exceptions on royalties.
5. Cal. Civ. Code § 730.06(c).
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6. See Int. Rev. Code 2055. See also
Rev. Rul. 60-385, 1960-2 Cum. Bull.
77; Rev. Rul. 67-33, 1967-5 Int. Rev
Bull. 9.
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as between beneficiaries of a testamentary trust. New Civil
Code section 730.05 refers to the applicable provisions of
the Probate Code, which establish the rule that unless the
will provides otherwise, income from trust assets accrues
from the date of death.7 New section 730.04(a) clarifies
the application of this rule in the situation where the income
beneficiary of a testamentary trust dies during the period of
probate administration. New section 730.04( a) provides
that the right to income, absent other directions in the governing instrument, accrues from the date an asset becomes
subject to the trust, and that an asset becomes subject to a
testamentary trust as of the date of the testator's death. This
section overcomes existing case law to the effect that the
death of an income beneficiary of a testamentary trust, occurring during the probate period, terminates his right to income
that has been accumulating in the probate estate for distribution to the trustee. 8
Turning to other 1967 legislation, new Probate Code section 1122 and Civil Code section 2274 depart from old
Civil Code section 2274, which had limited trustee fees to
the amount specified in the trust instrument. 9 The sections
now provide that when the trustee's compensation is fixed by
the provisions of the will or of the declaration of trust, the
court may nevertheless, on proper showing, allow the trustee
greater compensation, where the duties of the trustee are
substantially greater than were contemplated, where the compensation fixed by the instrument would be so unreasonably
low that a competent trustee would not undertake to administer the trust, or in other extraordinary circumstances. Since
inter vivos trusts, as opposed to testamentary trusts, are not
subject to court supervision in a continuing probate proceed7. See Cal. Prob. Code §§ 160, 162
and 162.5.
8. Estate of Feldman, 145 Cal. App.
2d 19, 301 P.2d 627 (1956).
9. The case law strictly construed the
statute. See In re Barton's Estate, 96
Cal. App.2d 234, 214 P.2d 857 (1950);
In re Whitney's Estate, 78 Cal. App.
220
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638, 248 P. 754 (1926). See also In re
Bodger's Estate, 130 Cal. App.2d 416,
279 P.2d 61 (1955), which holds that
Cal. Civ. Code § 2274 and Cal. Prob.
Code § 1122 are complementary and
therefore where trustee fees are fixed in
trust instrument, Cal. Prob. Code § 1122
does not apply.

16

Friedman: Trusts
and and
EstatesEstates
Trusts

ing, Civil Code section 2274 provides that the superior court
shall have jurisdiction to determine the trustee's compensation
in an action brought by the trustee of an inter vivos trust,
to which all interested persons are made parties.
Two other significant Probate Code changes are the 1967
amendment of section 423 and the addition of section 1120.2.
The amendment of Probate Code section 423 extends the
right of nomination of administrators to residents of the United
States of designated relationship to the decedent,lO who, but
for nonresidence in California, would themselves be entitled
to administration. New Probate Code section 1120.2 permits
the court to confer upon a testamentary trustee any or all of
a set of listed administrative powers not inconsistent with
the provisions or purposes of the trust. This last statute will
prove useful in cases where the trustee's administrative powers,
set forth in the will, are incomplete.
Smaller estates are affected by the amendment of Probate
Code section 630, which increases from $2,000 to $3,000 the
amount of an estate, consisting of personal property only,
that may be turned over to the decedent's next of kin, without
probate. Small estates are also affected by amendment of
Probate Code sections 645 and 646, which provide for summary distribution to the surviving spouse or minor children
of estates not exceeding $5,000, and measure the "other
estate" limitation applicable to the distributees by the amount
of the homestead exemption allowed the head of a family
(presently $15,000). Formerly this limitation was in the
fixed amount of $12,500.
With respect to distributions to nonresident beneficiaries,
section 19262 of the Revenue and Taxation Code was
amended in 1967 to require a certificate from the Franchise
Tax Board showing that all taxes due it have been paid, in
cases where assets having a total value of $5,000 are distributable from an estate on one or more nonresidents. The section
10. Those now included under the
1967 amendment are child, grandchild,
parent, brother and sister. Under former law, the only nonresident who was

eligible to nominate an administrator
was a nonresident spouse. Cal. Prob.
Code § 422.
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formerly required such a certificate if the value of the estate
exceeded $50,000 and any beneficiary was a nonresident.
Other miscellaneous changes include the amendment of
Probate Code section 1233, to codify California case lawl l
to the effect that the Civil Discovery Ace 2 is applicable to
probate proceedings. An amendment to Probate Code section 1852 adds to the powers of conservators those powers
granted to guardians by Probate Code sections 1550 through
1560.13
11. See, e.g., In re Neilson's Estate,
57 Cal.2d 733, 22 Cal. Rptr. I, 371 P.
2d 745 (1962); Coberly v. Superior
Court, 231 Cal. App.2d 685, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 64 (1965).
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12. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 307 and
2016.
13. Corresponding technical amendments were therefore made to Cal. Prob.
Code §§ 426, 630, 1060, 1062, 1121,
1208 and 1233.
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